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Empirical estimates indicate that the degree of linkage between
domestic real interest rates in Pacific Basin countries and that of the
United States is comparable to the linkage between most European
countries and the United States. Financial liberalization and other
developments that have affectedthe determination ofinterest rates in the
Pacific Basin region also are discussed.
The relation among real interest rates in different
countries is an important issue for policymakers
since the effectiveness of stabilization policies is
determined largely by the extent to which domestic
monetary and fiscal authorities can influence the
domestic real rate relative to the world rate.
While a number of studies of interest rate link-
ages between the U.S. and European countries exist
(von Furstenberg, 1983; Mishkin, 1984a, 1984b;
Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984; and Cumby and Mish-
kin, 1986), similar studies for other parts of the
world, particularly the developing regions, are scant
(see Blejer and Khan, 1983). This relative neglect
often has beenjustified by the rationale that compet-
itive forces have played little role in the determina-
tion of interest rates in most other countries, and
that controls and other market barriers impeded the
development of any linkages.
With the recent liberalizing financial trend in
many countries, however, particularly in the Pacific
Basin, this rationale no IQnger seems justified.
Moreover, as shall be discussed below, while barri-
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ers to international financial flows may prevent real
interest rates from being equalized, linkages
between rates in different countries may still exist.
The major purpose ofthis paper is to examine the
extentto which domestic realinterest rates in Pacific
Basin countries have been linked to rates in the
United States in recent years. The paper is
organized as follows. Section I discusses factors
affecting the relation of real interest rates among
countries. Section II summarizes specific financial
liberalization developments in the six countries
examined in the empirical section of the paper:
Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan,
and Australia. These countries were chosen because
each possesses a sufficiently long time series of a
market-influenced interest rate.
Section III empirically analyzes relationships
among real rates in the countries under study. This
section first describes the methodology ofgenerat-
ing estimates ofex ante real rates and of measuring
the extent to which these rates are related to that of
the United States. The methodology ofCumby and
Mishkin (1986) is employed to obtain consistent
estimates from ex post observations ofreal rates. It
then presents and discusses the empirical results.
Section IV provides a brief summary of conclu-
sions.I. Theory of Real Interest Rate Linkage
A country's real interest rate is equal to its nomi-
nal interest rate minus the expected rate ofinflation.
The relation ofreal interest rates between two coun-
tries thus depends on the relationship of nominal
interest rates through the interaction of their finan-
cial markets, on the relationship of price levels
through the interaction oftheir goods markets, and,
since their price levels are denominated in different
currencies, on the exchange rate between their cur-
rencies.
To see this, define the ex ante foreign and U.S.
real interest rates by
(1)
where rrj (rrus) and ij(ius) represent for countryj (the
U.S.) the expected real and nominal rates ofreturn,
respectively, at time t earned by holding the asset
from time tto t+ I,and pf (p~s) denotesthe expecta-
tion at time t of the inflation rate from t to t+ I,
where time scripts are omitted.
Let s denote the nominal foreign exchange price
of the dollar, Pj (Pus) the foreign (dollar) price of
foreign (D.S.) goods, and q = sPuslPj, the real
foreign price of the dollar. Note that a rise in s
represents an increase in the amount of foreign
currency necessary to buy a dollar and hence a
nominal foreign currency depreciation or, corre-
spondingly, a nominal appreciation ofthe dollar. A
rise in q represents an increase in the relative foreign
currency price of U.S. goods and hence a real
foreign currencydepreciation or, correspondingly, a
real dollar appreciation. A real foreign depreciation
occurs when a rise in nominal foreign currency
value of the dollar and in U.S. prices exceeds the
rise in foreign prices.
Adding and subtracting appropriately and using
the definition ofthe U.S. real rate implies
= ITus + W + P~s - pf) + (ij - ius - §e)
= ITus + qe + (ij - ius §e) (2)
where qe = §e + P~s - pf denotes the expected
change in the real exchange rate.
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Equation2 states thatreal interestrates may differ
between.countries because of two factors given by
the last two terms on the righthand side of the
expression. The first of these terms represents
expected deviations from purchasing power parity
(PPP) or, equivalently, expected real exchange rate
movements. According to PPP, the nominal
exchange rate is anticipated to change according to
the anticipated differential in rates of inflation,
leaving the real exchangerate constant. Thus, when
foreign inflation exceeds U.S. inflation, a foreign
currency depreciation is necessary to sustain pur-
chasing power parity between foreign and U.S.
currencies.
The last term represents deviations in uncovered
interest parity (DIP). According to DIP, the antici-
pated rate of depreciation of the foreign currency
should equal the nominal interest differential (pre-
suming U.S. and foreign assets are otherwise com-
parable). Thus, an anticipated foreign currency
depreciation should lead to a higher foreign interest
rate to compensate for the expected currency loss
associated with the anticipated depreciation, and
thereby leave the overall return to investing in
foreign assets equal to that from investing in U.S.
assets.
The existence of deviations from PPP and DIP
depends on a numberoffactors. Barriers to interna-
tional trade may create PPP deviations by limiting
the ability ofgoods market arbitrage to link domes-
tic and foreign inflation rates and the exchange rate.
PPP may not hold, even in the absence of goods
market trade barriers, when domestic and foreign
goods are not perfect substitutes. Moreover, devia-
tions from PPP may also occur because of various
factors affecting the equilibrium real exchange rate.
Differential changes in taste, technology, or factor
supplies can permanently influence relative price
competitiveness among countries and therefore the
real exchange rate between them. In addition,
changes in monetary and fiscal policy and other
economic demand and supply shocks can lead to
fluctuations in real exchange rates and hence devia-
tions from PPP. I To the extent that the effects of
these policy changes average out over time,however, the magnitude ofthis causeofreal interest
differentials diminishes.
Restrictions on international capital flows can
inhibit the ability of financial market arbitrage to
link domestic andforeign nominalinterest rates and
.the exchange rate and thereby create deviations
from DIP. DIP may not hold precisely even in the
absence of financial market imperfections when
domestic and·foreign assets are not perfect sub-
stitutes. In this case, deviations would arise from the
risk premium necessary to compensate investors for
holding the assetwith the higher risk.
To summarize, real interest rates are equal across
countries only in the absence of deviations from
PPP and DIP. They may differbecauseofdeviations
from PPPand/orDIP. Thus,forexample, the foreign
real rate can be below that in the U.S. in the case of
an expectedreal appreciation ofthe foreign currency
(qe< 0), adeviationfrom PPP, orbecausetheforeign
nominal return is less than the dollar equivalent
return(ij < ius + se), which is a deviation from UIP.
II. Pacific Basin Experiences
The discussion of the previous section implies
that the degree ofinternational linkage ofreal inter-
est rates depends on the degree of integration of
financial and goods markets as well as on expected
changes in the real exchange rate. In recent years,
the majority of countries in the Pacific Basin have
undertaken steps to liberalize their domestic finan-
cial systems and to remove restrictions on interna-
tional capital f1ows. 2 At the same time, these coun-
tries have been subject to various domestic and
foreign disturbances that have influenced their real
exchange rates. Thesedisturbances includeoil price
changes, commodity export price shocks, and for-
eign economic policy changes, such as the U.S.
fiseal expansion of the 1980s.
Since the process of financial liberalization has
been the foremost economic development within
most countries in the Pacific Basin region during the
1970s and 19805, the individual experiences ofthe
six countries examined in the empirical portion of
this paper are briefly discussed below. These coun-
tries include: Hong Kong and Singapore, which
liberalized earliest, in the early to mid-1970s; Mal-
aysia and Japan, which began liberalization some-
what later, in the late 1970s; and Australia and
Taiwan, which did not begin liberalization signifi-
cantly until the 1980s.3
Hong Kong
Hong Kong has been one of the least restricted
economies in the Pacific Basin. It formally abol-
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ished its last official exchange controls in December
1972, and, in general, now imposes no controls on
international capital receipts or payments by resi-
dents or nonresidents.
Over the period 1979 to 1983, Hong Kong's
financial system was subject to a number of
changes. In February 1979, the government
required the major note-issuing banks to back all
reserve assets with either currency or foreign
exchange assets. In April 1981, the banking system
was restructured and withholding taxes on domestic
assets were eliminated. In February 1982, withhold-
ing taxes on foreign currency deposits were abol-
ished as well. In October 1983, interest withholding
taxes on Hong Kong dollar deposits were elimi-
nated, and the Hong Kong dollar, which had been
allowed to f10atfreely since November 1974, was
pegged to the U.S. dollar. In addition, in the early
1980s, considerable uncertainty about the political
future ofHong Kong occasionally influenced finan-
cial markets.
Singapore
Singapore began deregulating the pricing ofmost
ofits financial markets in July 1975 and completely
liberalized foreign exchange transactions in June
1978. In principle, near perfect international capital
mobility exists: residents are free to make transac-
tions in any currency as well as to invest in any
currency. While nonresidents are similarly free totransact in Singaporean dollars, the authorities have
sought to some extent to segment domestic money
markets from the Asia dollar market- an offshore
currency market where rates are freely determined
(this practice differs from that ofHong Kong, which
has not sought to limit nonresidents' use of local
currency).
In addition, there is some historical evidence that
on occasion Singaporehas sought to limit the effects
of U.S. interest rates on domestic rates by "moral
suasion" (see Fry, 1985). Since 1975, the Monetary
Authority of Singapore has officially pegged the
Singaporean dollar to a trade-weighted basket of
currencies.
Malaysia
Malaysia followed Singapore in the pursuit of a
policy offinancial deregulation. Starting in August
1973, certain nonbank interest rates were freed, and
steps were taken to create more effective competi-
tion among commercial banks. In addition, the
currency was allowed to float. In October 1978,
measures were announced that reduced the extent of
administrative guidance, that made bank interest
rates more market-oriented, and that introduced
several new instruments, such as bankers' accep-
tances and CDs. These steps significantly increased
the responsiveness ofdeposit rates to the interbank
rate. However, despite the fostering ofprice compe-
tition, allocative requirements on bank loans are
still regularly imposed and priority sectors are
favored with low interest rates.
Malaysia has a system that is generally free of
exchange controls; its authorities impose virtually
no. restrictions on capital inflows or on capital
outflows as long as they are not financed by local
borrowing. However, the public is prohibited from
dealing in foreign exchange unless there is an under-
lying "genuine" trade transaction. Moreover, com-
mercial banks, which form the core of the foreign
exchange market, are limited in the open positions
they may undertake in foreign exchange transac-
tions.
Japan
Japan has followed a gradual process ofderegula-
tion of both domestic and international financial
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transactions since the mid-1970s, including lifting
interest rate ceilings and controls on international
capitalflows. In May 1979, foreigners were allowed
for the first time to acquire gensaki securities -
three-month repurchase agreements traded on one
of the few markets in Japan with competitively
determined interest rates.5 Japanese banks were
allowed to make short-term foreign currency loans
to residents (impact loans) in June 1979 and long-
term loans in March 1980. By freeing all interna-
tional transactions, in principle, from direct govern-
ment influence, amendments to the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in
December 1980 officially recognized the gradual
process of de-control of capital flows that had
already taken place. Nevertheless, the government
has periodically used "moral suasion" to limit
international capital transactions.
Efforts by the United States to induce the Jap-
anesegovernment to adopt a listofmeasures further
liberalizing its capital markets resulted in the May
1984 YenlDollar Agreement. Subsequent reforms
that have further facilitated increased international
capital flows include the end of yen-dollar swap
limits for foreign banks operating in Japan and the
removal of the requirement that all forward
exchange transactions be related to export and
import merchandise transactions or remittances in
June 1984.
Taiwan
Taiwan has been somewhat slower than the coun-
tries above in pursuing financial reform, although it
too began establishing open money markets in the
late 1970s. In April 1980, Taiwan relaxed official
restrictions on bank lending rates. The rates are
currentlysetby abankerscartel, the Taipei Bankers'
Association, which allows somewhat more flexible
rate adjustment. In November 1980, more flexible
interestrate adjustment was permittedon otherbank
instruments, including negotiable CDs and deben-
tures.
Even as Taiwan has liberalizedthese aspects ofits
financial market, it has kept international capital
movements greatly restricted. In December 1978,
residents were permitted to hold foreign exchange
deposits in designated banks and to buy and sellforeign exchange through these banks. InFebruary
1979, a foreign exchange market in which the
exchange rate was allowed to float within pre-set
limits was established. (The exchange rate was
devalued in July 1978; a further devaluation
occurred inAugust 1981.) In practice, the exchange
rate is set by a small group of commercial banks
together with the Central Bank.
Australia
Australia has only recently liberalized its finan-
cial markets although, in contrast to Taiwan, under-
took reforms in quick succession. Not until Decem-
ber 1980 were some interest rate ceilings and
quantitative guidelines on bank lending removed.
However, by December 1983, Australia had floated
its currency and abolished almost all foreign
exchange controls.
III. Analyzing Real Interest Rates
where E = P- pe represents the forecast error of
Methodology
Restating definition 1, the ex ante real interest
rate associated with agiven assetat time tis given by
eprr = i - p, (4)
where eprr represents the realized real return to
holding an asset from t to t+1, and p, the ex post
rate ofinflation.
Relationships 3 and 4 imply that the ex ante real
rate can be expressed as
where i and rrrepresent the nominal and expected
real rates ofreturn, respectively, at time t earned by
holding the asset from time t to t+ 1, and pe denotes
the expectationat time tofthe inflation rate from tto
t+ 1. The ex post real rate can be calculated by





the work ofCumby and Mishkin (1986). As Cumby
and Mishkin point out, the major difficulty in such
tests is thatthe expectedinflation rate, and hence the
ex ante real interest rate, is unobservable. One must
therefore take care in making statistical inferences
about ex ante real rates from observed data. The
methodology is described more fully below, and
empirical results follow.
rr = eprr + (p - pe) = eprr + E
In this section, we analyze real interest rate
linkages between the United States and six Pacific
Basin countries - Hong Kong, Singapore, Mal-
aysia, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia. These coun-
tries were chosen because each possesses a domes-
tic financial market that has been free enough to
provide meaningful interest rate statistics. A com-
parison of findings involving these countries with
those for developed countries provides useful evi-
dence of the extent of international integration of
asset and goods markets within the Pacific Basin.
Tests performed for the U.S. and other major
industrial countries by Mishkin (1984a, 1984b), von
Furstenberg (1983), Cumby and Obstfeld (1984),
Mishkin (1984a, 1984b), and Cumby and Mishkin
(1986) generally reject the hypothesis that real
interest rates are equalized across countries.6
However, Cumby and Mishkin have measured the
extent to which real rates in the U.S., Canada, and
Europe are linked and move together over time.
They find that real rates have climbed dramatically
from the 1970s to the 1980s in the U.S. and abroad,
and that there is a significant positive association
between movements in U.S. real rates and those
abroad. This strong and statistically significant
tendency for real rates to move together in different
countries, even though the movement is notone-for-
one, suggests that some degree of international
linkage exists among the countries.
We proceed by discussing the econometric meth-
odology ofthe tests employed, which were basedon
35which, because both eprrand X are observable, can
be estimated byordinary least squares. Estimates of
the ex ante real rate can then be obtained from the
fitted values ofthis regression.8
where 0 = all available information at time t. In
other words, the forecast error of inflation is uncor-
related with any information available at time t.
Correspondingly, 5 and 7 imply
where B is a vector of coefficients and u is a
measurement error term such that E[u IX] = 0.7.
Because rr is not observable by an econometrician
either, equation 9 cannot be estimated directly.
However, substituting equation 9 into equation 5
and re-arranging gives
(11 )
eprrj = aj + bjeprrus + (Wj - Ej + bjEuJ, (12)
which depends only on observables. However,
because the error term Wj - Ej + bjEus is not
uncorrelated with the explanatory variable epprus
(eprrus is realized at time t+ 1 and is thus correlated
with Eus), an instrumental variables estimation
method is necessary to obtain consistent estimates.
Consistency requires that the instruments used to
estimate the ex ante U.S. real interest rate be uncor-
related with the errorcomponents in equation12-
the inflation error terms in the foreign country and
the U.S., Ej and Eus' and the linkage error wj.
Choosing the instruments from the available infor-
mation set e implies by definition that they are
uncorrelated with the expectational errors, Ej and
Eus. To ensure that they are also uncorrelated with
the linkage error Wj' it is necessary to choose
instruments that exert no additional influence on the
interest rate in country j apart from their influence
on the real rate in the U.S. As suggested by Cumby
and Mishkin, a natural choice for instruments that
satisfy these requirements are those variables in X
that predict the U.S. ex post real rate well.
The tests of interest rate linkage are constructed
from the hypothesis
Empirical Results
The sample range in the empirical analysis con-
sisted ofquarterly data over the period I974QIV to
1986QI (to 1985QIV for Malaysia). All data were
obtained from the IMF International Financial Sta-
tisticsornational sources. Whereavailable, the rates
used were end-of-period90-day rates. More specifi-
cally, the 90-day Treasury bill rate was used for the
where rrj denotes the ex ante real rate in countryj,
rrus that in the U.S., and Wj is an error term. The
hypothesis ofequal real returns implies aj = 0 and
bj = 1, while the hypothesis that there is no link
between rates implies bj = o. Partial linkage is
indicated if O<bj< 1.
Becausethe ex ante real returns are not observed,
this regression equation cannot be estimated
directly. However, using the expression for the ex






(10) E) = XB + T]
rr = XB + u,
eprr = XB + (u
rr = E[eprrIO]
E[tIO] = 0,
pC = E[p I0]
and hence
that is, the ex ante real rate is given by the expected
value ofthe ex post rate conditional on the informa-
tion seteor, equivalently, by the fitted linearregres-
sion relationship between the ex post rate and e.
To take account ofthe fact that an econometrician
does not know all the information available to
agents, assume that the ex ante real rate formed at
timet is linearly correlated with variables in the set
X thatcanbeobservedby aneconometricianat time
t and are contained in the available information set
O. This implies
inflation. Thus the ex ante and ex post real rates
differ only because of inflation forecast errors.
Since ex ante inflation expectations cannot be
observed, ex ante real rates cannot be determined
directly from the calculation of ex post rates.
However, by inferring information about the rela-
tionship between expected inflation and other vari-
ables known at time t, it is possible to generate
results about the ex ante real rate from regressions
involving only ex post data.
More specifically, assuming rational expecta-
tions, that is, that expectations offuture inflation at
time t depend on all available information,
36U.S., the 3-month gensaki rate for Japan,9 and the
90-day commercial bill rate for Australia. For Tai-
wan, the short-term curb rate was employed, 10 and
for Malaysia the overnightcommercialbillrate. 11 In
the case of Hong Kong, the mid-point of the low-
high range ofthe overnight interbank rate in the last
month ofeach quarter was used.
The variables in the information set Xused instru-
mentally to estimate real rates in individual coun-
tries included a constant term, linear and quadratic
time trend, the nominal interest rate, and three
values of lagged inflation. The addition of other
variables, such as money growth, was not found to
provide any additional explanatory power, except
for the case ofMalaysia.
Quandt statistics (1960) and Chow tests were
used to test for evidence of shifts in the stochastic
structure of real interest rate levels. A regime shift
was found for the U.S. from 1980QI to 1982QIII.
This result is consistent with the findings of Hui-
zinga and Mishkin (1986) and others of a shift in
monetary policy behavior by the Federal Reserve in
late 1979, with subsequent return to the original
regime after the third quarter of 1982. For Japan a
regime shift was found to occur in 1979QI. This
shift may be identified as related to the greaterfocus
of the Bank of Japan on monetary aggregates than
on interestrates thatpurportedly began in July 1978
(see Hutchison, 1986).
Shifts found for other countries took place in
Hong Kong in 1981QIV, Singapore in 1977QIII,
Malaysia in 1980QII, and Taiwan in 1979QIV;
although no significant shift was found for Aus-
tralia. These shifts may be attributable to the effects
offinancial liberalization steps, although the cause
is impossibleto determine conclusively. Itshouldbe
noted that these regime breaks cannot be deter-
mined precisely; breaks may have occurred before
or after the periods indicated, and other breaks also
may have occurred. The ones reported are those
with F-statistics with less than 5 percent signifi-
cance.
The final estimates of ex ante real rates were
obtained by including in the regression equation
multiplicative dummy terms for all variables in X;
the dummy was set equal to 0 before the shift point
37and one at the shift point and after (except for the
U.S. where it was set equal to 0 again after
1982Qm).
Charts 1 through 7 (appended) graph the ex ante
real (and nominal) interest levels in each of these
countries. Observe that the real interest rate appears
to have risen in all cases in the 1980s in correspon-
dence with the rise in the U.S. real rate. Note that in
the case of Taiwan, interest rate levels are par-
ticularly high due to the higher transaction costs and
risk associated with the interest rate measure
employed - the curb rate.
Table 1contains the results oflinkage regressions
for the six Pacific Basin countries with the United
States. As discussed above, econometric considera-
tions dictate the use ofthe information set X used to
predict the U. S. real rate - a constant, linear and
quadratic time trend, the nominal U.S. interest rate,
and three values oflagged U.S. inflation, as well as
multiplicative dummy terms involving these vari-
ables as instruments. Intercept dummy coefficients
were also included for several of the countries to
remove outlying observations from the sample, but
are not reported. 12
Ofparticularinterest in Table 1is the coefficientb
that describes the amount ofmovement in the coun-
try's real rate for a given movement in the U.S. rate.
The hypotheses that real rates are equal across
countries, a = 0 and b = 1, or are fully linked
across internationally, b = I,are generally rejected.
However, in all cases the hypothesis of no linkage
between real rates in different countries, b = 0, is
rejected as well. In all cases, the b coefficient lies
between 0 and I: Hong Kong has the highest coeffi-
cient at .64; Malaysia has a coefficient of .62;
Singapore, .48; Japan, .46; Australia has the lowest
coefficient, .38. Somewhat surprisingly the coeffi-
cient for Taiwan, at .58, appears somewhat high
given the limited extent offinancial liberalization in
that country. None ofthe results appeared sensitive
to correction for serial correlation.
It is interesting to compare these results with
those obtained by Cumby and Mishkin for linkages
between Canada, several European countries, and
the U.S. over the period June 1973 to December
1983. 13 Using domestic money rates, they obtained
figures for b of .91 for Canada, .77 for the United
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Kingdom, .63 for Italy, .58 for France, .52 for the
Netherlands, .44 for Germany, and .16 for Switzer-
land. These results indicate that, for most Pacific
Basin countries, the degree oflinkage with the U.S.
is less than that ofCanada but comparable to that of
most European countries.
To investigate the possibility that financial liber-
alization orotherdevelopments have influenced the
degree of linkage over the sample period, tests for
shifts in the estimated b coefficients were per-
formed. One ofthe difficulties encountered in these
tests is that, in mostcases, the relaxation offinancial
controls has been gradual rather than abrupt. This
makes it difficult to identify any single point in time
that corresponds with a discrete change in the rela-
tionship between domestic and foreign rates. As a
result, the usefulness of tests such as the Quandt
statistic, which are best usedfor detecting the occur-
rence ofdiscrete changes at particularpoints in time
within a sample, is limited.
The approach adopted here was to introduce
various dummy variables, both separately and mul-
tiplicatively, for periods of one or more quarters.
The durations chosen correspond to dates on orover
which financial liberalization measures were
announced as well as dates on which shifts in
domestic real interest rate determination had pre-
viously been identified.
Significant intercept dummies at times were
found, but shifts in the b coefficients were not.
Taking account of the intercept shifts and outlying
observations generally improved the fit of the rela-
tionship without affecting the magnitude of the b
coefficients. Thus, the analysis provided no evi-
dence ofchanges in the degree of sensitivity to the
U.S. real rate.
The lack ofevidence ofany change in the degree
ofinterestlinkage has several possibleexplanations.
One explanation, of course, is that there may have
been no actual change in the levels of linkage over
the period studied. For some ofthe countries in the
analysis, the interest rate used may have been deter-
mined relatively competitively over most of the
sample period; for other countries, any change in
the degree of international arbitrage may have
occurred too late in the period to have been identi-
fied econometrically.Second, the results may indicate that, while
financial marketliberalizationhas alloweddomestic
interest rates in most countries to be more competi-
tively determined in relation to domestic economic
conditions, remaining restrictions on international
capital flows and intermittentlyapplied government
controls have effectively limited changes in the role
of international factors. 14
A thirdexplanation liesinrecognizing, as argued
in Section I, that real interest rate linkages depend
not only on international financial market arbitrage
but also on linkages between prices in different
countries through the interaction ofgoods markets.
The latter may have masked the effects of interest
rate liberalization. More specifically, it is possible
that while financial market liberalization in the
countries studied has resulted in smaller deviations
from uncovered interest parity, thereby leading to
closer real rate linkage, larger deviations from pur-
chasing power parity associated with expected real
exchange rate movements may have weakened the
linkage. One can make a strong case for this pos-
sibility since, during the 1980s when the process of
financial liberalization was in full swing in the
countries under study, the real value of the dollar
underwent a dramatic appreciation that generated a
strong expectation of subsequent real dollar
depreciation.
IV. Conclusion
This study has discussed developments affecting
real interest rates in the Pacific Basin. In recent
years, the countries in this region have allowed both
domestic and foreign market forces to playagreater
role in the determination of interest rates in their
economies. Empirical estimates indicate that the
degree of real interest rate linkage with the United
States is comparable to that of most European
countries. Efforts to detectany increase in the extent
of this linkage over time were unsuccessful.
The result that the real interest rates of Pacific
Basin countries analyzed in this study are not tied
Chart 1










one-for-one to that ofthe United States implies that
the monetary and fiscal authorities of these coun-
tries have some influence over their domestic real
rates and some control of their stabilization pol-
icies. However, the existence of interest rate link-
ages indicates that, as with countries in more
developed regions, economic market forces are at
work integrating their financial and goods markets
with those abroad. Thus, domestic economic condi-
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40FOOTNOTES
1. Various explanations exist for the realexchange effects
of disturbances. Some argue that labor and/or goods
market rigidities imply that the adjustment to disturbances
does not occursimultaneously, leading to short-run effects
on real variables, such as real exchange rates (Dorn-
busch, 1976 and Obstfeld, 1985). Others attribute these
effects to confusion about the source of these distur-
bances (Kimbrough, 1983; Flood and Hodrick, 1985; Glick
and Wihlborg, 1986; Glick, 1986).
2. The appropriate order of liberalization of domestic and
international restrictions is an important topic in the
development economics literature. In some cases, par-
ticularly countries in Latin America, international controls
were removed at the same time that domestic interest rates
were allowed to rise at the very beginning of the liberaliza-
tion process. E3ecause this oftel'l resulted in large scale
capital inflows (due to the return of funds involved in past
capital flight in response to higher domestic rates as well
as new borrowing from foreign financial institutions) that
caused the domestic currency to appreciate, it has been
argued that international liberalization, particularly of the
capital account, should be delayed. See Edwards (1984)
and Frenkel (1982). By contrast, countries in the Pacific
Basin generally appear to have adopted a more gradual
approach to liberalization.
3. Among other countries in the Pacific Basin, New Zea-
land experienced a brief period of interest liberalization
between 1976 and 1981 that, after an abrupt reversal, was
resumed in 1983. More cautious movements towards liber-
alization have occurred in Thailand. While Korea and the
Philippines have also taken certain steps toward deregula-
tion, they still continue to maintain restrictive controls on
mostfinancial transactions, particularly international finan-
cial transactions. Greenwood (1986) provides a survey of
financial deregulation developments in seven East Asian
countries, including Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia. Also see
Jao and Lee (1982).
4. It should be pointed out that, in general, the monetary
and banking relationship between Singapore and Mal-
aysia is not close, even though these countries were
formerly one political entity, used the same currency (the
Malay dollar), and had the same banking system.
5. The gensaki market evolved spontaneously in the
mid-1970s with relatively little government intervention. In
March 1976, Japan's MinistryofFinance formally acknowl-
edged the existence of the gensaki market by laying down
ground rules for trading. Many observers attribute Japan's
policy reversal in the late 1970s, which allowed foreigners
access to the gensaki and other markets, to a desire to
encourage capital .inflows at a time when the yen was
beginning to depreciate.
6. Frankel (1986) contends that the primary source of the
rejection ofreal rate equalityfor theindustrialized countries
is the failure of purchasing power parity since international
goods market integration is far weaker than international
financial market integration (or equivalently that goods in
different countries are far from being perfect substitutes).
However, others (Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984), have
provided evidence in the case of developed countries
against uncovered interest parity that is as strong as that
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against purchasing power parity.
7. Note that u is also in the information set e because
agents know the ex ante real rate even if the econometri-
cian does not.
8. It should be noted that the regression residuals must
not be heteroscedastic or serially correlated to yield cor-
rect standard errors for B. Furthermore, the estimates of rr
obtained are good only when the variance of the u term is
small. The variance would be small if no relevant informa-
tion left out were highly correlated with X.
9. Gensaki transactions consist of the resale or
repurchase of bonds at a fixed price after a fixed period,
generally within 3 months. In essence, they are short-term
capital transactions using bonds as collateral.
10. The curb market is an unofficial, largely unregulated
financial market involving small borrowers and lenders. In
the mid-1970s, the aggregate size of the curb market in
Taiwan was as large as all other financial institutions put
together. In 1980, it accounted for roughly 30 percent of
total domestic assets (see Cheng, 1986, p. 151). Due to
higher transactions costs, risk premiums, etc., the cost of
funds in the curb market is substantially greater. No con-
sistent series exist for rates on new instruments permitted
in the late 1970s. Data for this series was obtained from
monthly issues of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
11. Commercial paper rates are preferable to other inter-
est series in Malaysia. Treasury bills are held mainly to
satisfy minimum liquidity requirements and other portfolio
restrictions imposed on commercial banks and otherfinan-
cial institutions and are sold at below-market yields. Sim-
ilarly, interest rates on call loans to discount houses are
influenced by the use of call loans in satisfying minimum
liquidity requirements. Furthermore, the corporate bond
market is extremely thin, and a consistent interest rate
series is not available for the negotiable CDs introduced in
1978.
12. Individual intercept dummies were set equal to 1 for
the following dates: Singapore, 7501, 79011; Malaysia,
7501, SOOIV; Taiwan, 7901V, 81011, 780111-81011; and
Australia, 750111, 8301V-8601. The last dummy for Taiwan
corresponds to a period of severe exchange market con-
trols, whereas the last dummyfor Australia corresponds to
a period of rapid financial market liberalization.
13. The data set of Cumby and Mishkin, unlike that in this
paper, involves overlapping observations. Because this
leads to serially correlated errors, they use atwo-step, two-
stage least squares procedure developed by Cumby,
Huizinga, and Obstfeld (1983). This procedure avoids
problems associated with applying Cochrane-OrcutHype
techniques to models assuming rational expectations (see
Flood and Garber, 1980).
14. For example, Frankel (1984) contends that, since
1979, covered interest parity through forward markets has
held as closely for Japan as for the U.K., Germany, and
Switzerland. By this criterion, he argues that Japan has
been as open internationally as other developed countries,
and disputes the claim that the Japanese still employ
capital market restrictions.
However, Otani and Tiwari (1981), who analyzed capitalcontrol distortions in the gensaki market over the period
197801 to 198101, find evidence of capital flow restrictions
even after such restrictions were supposedly eliminated.
They found that from 197801 - 197901, distortions were
indeed on a declining trend - with almost no distortions
from 1979011 - 197901V. However, they found that distor-
tions increased in 198001 and 19800111 due to a Japanese
government "request" that deposit institutions exercise
restraint in accepting foreign exchange from the sale of
foreign currency assets; distortions declined again begin-
ning in 198001V. These results suggestthat despiteofficial
policies, the Japanesegovernmentstill retains the abilityto
influence capital flows when it so wishes.
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